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We explore the computational complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria for a new class of strategic games
called integer programming games with difference of piecewise linear convex payoffs. Integer programming
games are games where players’ action sets are integer points inside of polytopes. Using recent results from
the study of short rational generating functions for encoding sets of integer points pioneered by Alexander
Barvinok, we present efficient algorithms for enumerating all pure Nash equilibria, and other computations
of interest, such as the pure price of anarchy, and pure threat point, when the dimension and number of
“convex” linear pieces in the payoff functions are fixed. Sequential games where a leader is followed by
competing followers (a Stackelberg–Nash setting) are also considered.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we introduce a new class of strategic games that have appealing properties, and whose
set of pure Nash equilibria can be described in a convenient encoding by rational generating func-
tions using techniques pioneered by Barvinok (1994) and expanded by Barvinok and Woods (2003).
Generating functions techniques based on Barvinok’s results have been applied to discrete opti-
mization (see, for instance, De Loera et al. (2008), De Loera et al. (2007)), and various other areas
of applied and pure mathematics (see De Loera (2005) for a survey). To the authors’ knowledge
this is the first application of the theory of rational generating functions to the study of games.
This paper is motivated by open questions regarding the computational complexity of decid-
ing the existence of pure Nash equilibria in strategic games. For a general reference on complex-
ity issues in game theory see Papadimitriou (2007). As opposed to the case of mixed-strategy
Nash equilibria which are guaranteed to exist for every game, the general problem of deciding
if a strategic game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard (Gottlob et al. (2005)). In view of
this difficulty, the problem has been explored under various restrictions on the actions and pay-
offs of the players; for instance, in graphical games (Alvarez et al. (2005), Gottlob et al. (2005)),
congestion games (Dunkel and Schulz (2008), Fabrikant et al. (2004)) and action graph games
(Jiang and Leyton-Brown (2007)). This paper continues this tradition, by introducing a class of
games that will be shown to have convenient algorithms to decide if instances have pure Nash
equilibria, and if they exist, to compute them.
We consider integer programming games, which are simultaneous games where the players’ actions
(pure strategies) are lattice points (i.e., integer points) inside polytopes described by systems of
linear inequalities. Since the sets of actions are given implicitly by the description of polytopes, they
may be of exponential size with respect to the input size. In our setting, each player’s payoffs are
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given as difference of piecewise linear convex (DPLC) functions. As an aside, optimization problems
involving the difference of convex functions are a well-studied class of nonconvex programs (see for
example Horst and Thoai (1999)).
The main result of the paper is that the set of pure Nash equilibria of integer programming games
with DPLC payoffs can be encoded as a short rational generating function in polynomial time when
the number of players, dimensions of the polytopes that define the action sets and the number
of “convex” linear pieces in the payoffs are all fixed. Although these conditions are restrictive,
note that each player may have an exponential number of actions. Indeed integer programming
games with DPLC payoffs are a subset of a general class of games where deciding if a pure Nash
equilibrium exists is Σp2-complete with a fixed number of players and exponential-sized strategy
spaces Alvarez et al. (2005).
Besides questions of complexity, a short rational generating function encoding is a convenient
data structure for answering other questions of interest regarding the structure of pure Nash
equilibria and related concepts. For instance, several questions analogous to those explored in
Conitzer and Sandholm (2003) regarding mixed strategy Nash equilibria can be answered efficiently
in our setting for pure Nash equilibria by using the rational generating function data structure.
We feel the main contributions of the paper are:
• Introducing the use of Barvinok short rational generating functions to the study of strategic
games and demonstrating the power of encoding sets of pure equilibria as generating functions.
• Presenting a tractable class of games, integer programming games with DPLC payoffs, for
which pure strategy Nash equilibria and related quantities can be computed in polynomial time
when certain dimensions are fixed.
Also of note are two ideas used in several places in this paper:
• In order to represent sets of equilibria, or other sets of interest, as rational generating functions
we express the set as an overall feasible set in which unwanted elements, expressed as the union of
projections of lattice point sets in polytopes, are removed. See for instance the proof of Theorem 5
where the set of pure Nash equilibria is defined in this way. This is a general technique that is
adapted to various settings in Sections 4 to 6.
• Some results are easier to show when the actions for each player in the game are extended to
include a component that captures the payoff of that player. This extension allows for descriptions of
extended strategy profiles and equilibria that are more amenable to generating function techniques
and can readily be converted back to normal strategy profiles and equilibria. See for instance
Definition 3.
The paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 introduces integer programming
games and discusses an application of this framework to a model of competing firms producing
identical indivisible goods. Section 3 reviews the basic theory of Barvinok generating functions and
major results that will be used in the remainder of the paper. Section 4 discusses pure Nash equilibria
and contains the main contributions of the paper – demonstrating how generating functions can
be used to encode sets of pure Nash equilibria. Section 5 details several other applications of
generating function constructions to the computation of Pareto optima, the price of anarchy, and
pure minmax values. Lastly, Section 6 describes a sequential (Stackelberg–Nash) version of an
integer programming game where a leader’s actions affects the description of the polytopes defining
the actions sets of a group of followers, who then play a simultaneous game.
2. Integer Programming Games
We begin by introducing the following class of strategic games:
Definition 1 (Integer Programming Game). An integer programming game with n players
is a noncooperative game where the Si of actions for each player i is the set of lattice points inside
a polytope; that is,
Si =Pi ∩Z
di (1)
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where Pi = {x∈R
di :Mix≤bi} is a rational polytope.
Let I = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of players. The set S of action profiles s = (s1, . . . , sn) is the
Cartesian product of the Si’s:
S =
n∏
i=1
Si ⊆Z
d
where d= d1+ · · ·+ dn. The payoff functions are integer-valued of the form ui : S→Z for i∈ I.
As noted in the introduction, a distinguishing feature of this class of games is that the action sets
Si are defined succinctly by linear systems Mix≤ bi, even though |Si| may be exponential in size
with respect to the input size of Mi and bi. We use rational generating functions to avoid explicitly
enumerating each player’s action set.
Definition 2 (DPLC payoffs). An integer-valued payoff function u : S → Z of a game is a
difference of piecewise-linear convex functions or DPLC function if it can be expressed as:
u(s) =max
k∈K
fk(s)−max
l∈L
gl(s)
where the fk and gl are affine functions with integer coefficients and where K and L are finite index
sets. We refer to the fk as the “convex” pieces of u and the gl as the “concave” pieces of u.
We consider integer programming games where each player i has a DPLC payoff function
ui(s) =max
k∈Ki
fiki(s)−max
l∈Li
gili(s) (2)
again where the fik and gil are given affine functions with integer coefficients and the sets Ki and
Li are given finite index sets.
A first comment regarding this class of games is that they can express any finite game given
in normal form. A normal form game is defined by action sets A1, . . . ,An and payoffs πi(a) for
a ∈A1× · · ·×An and i∈ I. We refer to the set A=
∏n
i=1Ai as the set of action profiles. A normal
form game is finite is A is finite. We use the alternate notation Ai and πi, as opposed to Si and ui,
for normal form games to draw a contrast between the fact that in normal form game the actions
sets and payoffs for each action profile are given explicitly as part of the input, whereas in integer
programming games the action sets Si and payoffs ui are given implicitly. This contrast between
implicit and explicit representations is important when one considers the computational complexity
of finding pure Nash equilibria (see Alvarez et al. (2005) for a technical discussion).
Proposition 1. Every finite normal form game is equivalent to an integer programming game
with DPLC payoffs.
Proof. Let finite normal form game G be defined by action sets A1, . . . ,An and payoffs πi(a) for
a ∈ A. Let di equal the number of elements in the action set Ai. Let vector xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,di)
denotes a mixed strategy profile for player i. Mixed strategy profiles x lie in the unit simplex:
Pi = {xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,di)∈R
di : xi ≥ 0,
di∑
j=1
xi,j = 1}.
This is a polytope, and the lattice points inside Pi are exactly its vertices, which correspond to
pure strategies (actions) for player i, namely, an action ai in Ai is represented by its characteristic
vector χi(ai). Thus, we represent the set of pure strategies for player i as Si = Pi ∩Z
di. As above
let S = S1× · · · ×Sn. This conforms to the framework of integer programming games.
As for the payoffs, our goal is to convert the explicitly given payoffs πi over the set A of action
profiles into equivalent DPLC payoff functions ui over S. Let A
+
i = {a ∈A : πi(a)> 0} and A
−
i =
{a ∈A : πi(a)< 0}. For every x= (χ1(a1), . . . , χn(an))∈ S, define the DPLC payoff
ui(x) = max
ai∈A
+
i
πi(a)
(
n∑
i=1
xi,ai −n+1
)
− max
ai∈A
−
i
πi(a)
(
n−
n∑
i=1
xi,ai − 1
)
.
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Note that for every a ∈A we have ui(χ1(a1), . . . , χn(an)) = πi(a). Thus the normal form game G is
equivalent to the integer programming game with pure strategy sets Si and DPLC payoffs ui. 
Note that this representation has the same input size as the normal form game itself. Further
computational complexity consequences of this proposition are discussed in Remark 2.
Another useful result demonstrates the power of modeling payoffs as DPLC functions. Zalgaller
(2000, Theorem 4.2) shows that every continuous piecewise linear function can be represented as
the difference of two piecewise linear convex functions. Thus, a DPLC function can be used to
describe any continuous piecewise linear payoff function, which in turn can be used to approximate
an arbitrary continuous payoff function.
Example 1 (Cournot game with indivisible goods and fixed production costs).
A set of n manufacturers (the players) produce indivisible goods which are then sold in a market.
Player i chooses an integer production level sij for each of its indivisible products j ∈ {1, . . . , di}
subject to resource constraints Misi ≤ bi where si = (si1, . . . , sidi). Thus, player i’s action set Si is
the set of integer points in a polytope in Rdi. The payoff to each player consists of revenues and
production costs. Under usual assumptions, the revenue to each player i is a concave function of
the action profile s, which can be expressed as a piecewise linear concave function minl∈Ri ril(s).
For each player i and product j there may be a fixed production cost Fij . The variable production
cost is a convex function of the production levels si expressed as a piecewise linear convex function
maxl∈Ci cil(si). The payoff to player i is thus
ui(s) =
di∑
j=1
max{−Fij ,−Fijsij}−
(
max
l∈Ri
(−ril(s))+max
l∈Ci
cil(si)
)
which can be expressed as a DPLC function. As will be discussed further in Remark 3, this is
precisely the structure that is analyzed in this paper.
3. Introduction to rational generating functions
We give a very brief overview of the theory of short rational generating functions used in this paper.
Barvinok (1994) introduced an algorithm for determining the exact number of lattice points in a
rational polytope P = {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b} , that runs in polynomial time for every fixed dimen-
sion n. This algorithmic breakthrough provided a strengthening of the famous algorithm of Lenstra
(1983), which allows to decide whether P contains a lattice point in polynomial time for every fixed
dimension.
Barvinok’s method works as follows. Consider the generating function of the lattice point set P ∩
Zn, which is defined as the multivariate Laurent polynomial
g(P ;ξ) =
∑
x∈P∩Zn
ξx =
∑
x∈P∩Zn
ξx11 · · ·ξ
xn
n ∈ Z[ξ
±1
1 , . . . , ξ
±1
n ]. (3)
This Laurent polynomial, when encoded as a list of monomials, has exponential encoding size.
Barvinok’s algorithm computes a different representation of the function g(P ;ξ) as a sum of basic
rational functions in the form
g(P ;ξ) =
∑
i∈I
γi
ξci
(1− ξdi1)(1− ξdi2) . . . (1− ξdin)
, (4)
where I is a polynomial-size index set and all data are integer. This algorithm runs in polynomial
time whenever the dimension n is a fixed constant. A formula of the type (4) is called a short
rational generating function.
Note that each of the basic rational functions has poles (the point ξ = 1 in particular is a pole
of all the basic rational functions), but after summing up only removable singularities remain.
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Obtaining the exact number of lattice points of P is easy in (3), since clearly |P ∩ Zn|= g(P ;1).
Since (4) is a formula for the same function (except for removable singularities), we also have
|P ∩ Zn| = limξ→1 g(P ;ξ), which can be evaluated in polynomial time by performing a residue
calculation with each basic rational function in the sum (4). An important point to note is that this
evaluation is possible with arbitrary rational generating functions that correspond to finite lattice
point sets. In other words, if we can compute in polynomial time a rational generating function
of a finite lattice point set S ⊆ Zn, we can also compute in polynomial time its cardinality |S|.
Therefore, we can also decide in polynomial time whether S 6= ∅.
A first, trivial observation that allows to combine rational generating functions is the follow-
ing. Let X ⊆ Zn and Y ∈ Zk be lattice point sets given by their short rational generating func-
tions g(X;ξ) and g(Y ;η). Then the direct product (Cartesian product) X × Y also has a short
rational generating function that is simply the product of the rational functions:
g(X ×Y ;ξ,η) = g(X;ξ)× g(Y ;η).
Barvinok and Woods (2003) developed powerful algorithms to obtain short rational generating
functions of more general lattice point sets. The first of these algorithms concerns constant-length
Boolean combinations of finite lattice point sets that are already given by rational generating
functions.
Theorem 1 (Boolean Operations Theorem). (Corollary 3.7 in Barvinok and Woods
(2003)) Let m and ℓ be fixed integers, and let φ : {0,1}m → {0,1} be any Boolean function such
that φ(0) = 0. Then there exists a constant s = s(ℓ,m) and a polynomial-time algorithm for the
following problem. Given as input, in binary encoding,
(I1) the dimension n and
(I2) rational generating functions
g(Sp;ξ) =
∑
i∈Ip
γpi
ξcpi
(1− ξdpi1) . . . (1− ξdpis)
,
of m finite sets Sp ⊆ Z
n, represented by the rational numbers γpi, integer vectors cpi and dpij
for p=1, . . . ,m, i∈ Ip, j =1, . . . , ℓmp such that the numbers ℓmp of terms in the denominators
are at most ℓ,
output, in binary encoding,
(O1) rational numbers γi, integer vectors ci, dij for i∈ I, j =1, . . . , si, where si ≤ s, such that
g(S;ξ) =
∑
i∈I
γi
ξci
(1− ξdi1) . . . (1− ξdisi )
is a rational generating function of the finite set S that is the Boolean combination of
S1, . . . , Sp corresponding to the function φ.
Note that the restriction φ(0) = 0 ensures that the set S will be finite. The essential part of
the construction of Theorem 1 is the implementation of set intersections, which are based on the
Hadamard product (Barvinok and Woods 2003, Definition 3.2), which is the bilinear extension of
the operation defined on monomials as
αxξ ∗α′xξ
′
=
{
αα′xξ if ξ= ξ′,
0 otherwise.
With this definition, clearly
g(S1 ∩S2) = g(S1;ξ) ∗ g(S2;ξ).
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Another powerful method to define lattice point sets is by integer projections. Let S ⊆ Zn be a
finite lattice point set, given by its rational generating function g(S;ξ). Let ψ : Zn →Zk be a linear
function and denote by T =ψ(S) the image (projection) of S. If the map ψ is one-to-one (injective)
from S, then the generating function g(T ;η) of the projection T can be computed by making a
monomial substitution in g(S;ξ); see Barvinok and Woods (2003, Theorem 2.6). This fact is used
in the proof of Corollary 2.
When S is the set of lattice points in a polytope P , the integer projection method of
Barvinok and Woods (2003) can be employed to construct a rational generating function of the
projection T .
Theorem 2 (Projection Theorem). (Theorem 1.7 in Barvinok and Woods (2003)) Let the
dimension n be a fixed constant. Then there exists a constant s = s(n) and a polynomial-time
algorithm for the following problem. Given as input, in binary encoding,
(I1) an inequality description of a rational polytope P ⊂R
n;
(I2) a positive integer k; and
(I3) a linear map ψ : Z
n →Zk given by an integral matrix;
output, in binary encoding,
(O1) rational numbers γi, integer vectors ci, dij for i∈ I, j =1, . . . , si, where si ≤ s, such that
g(T ;ξ) =
∑
i∈I
γi
ξci
(1− ξdi1) . . . (1− ξdisi )
is a rational generating function of the set T =ψ(P ∩Zn).
Once a rational generating function of a set S has been computed, various pieces of information
can be extracted from it. We have already mentioned that it is possible to compute the cardinality
of S In addition to that, we can explicitly enumerate all elements of S. Since the cardinality of S
can be exponential in the encoding length of the input, we use output-sensitive complexity analysis,
i.e., to measure the complexity of the enumeration algorithm in terms of both the input and the
output. The strongest notion of an output-sensitive polynomial-time enumeration algorithm is that
of a polynomial-space polynomial-delay enumeration algorithm. Such an algorithm only uses space
that is polynomial in the encoding length of the input data. In addition, the time spent between
outputting two items, and before outputting the first item and after outputting the last item, is
bounded by a polynomial in the encoding length of the input data. The following result is a version
of Theorem 7 of De Loera et al. (2007).
Theorem 3 (Enumeration Theorem). Let the dimension k and the maximum number ℓ of
binomials in the denominator be fixed. Then there exists a polynomial-space polynomial-delay enu-
meration algorithm for the following enumeration problem. Given as input, in binary encoding,
(I1) a number M ∈Z+;
(I2) rational numbers γi, integer vectors ci, dij for i∈ I, j =1, . . . , ℓi, where ℓi ≤ ℓ such that∑
i∈I
γi
sci0
(1− sdi10 )(1− zdi2) . . . (1− s
dis
0 )
is a rational generating function of a set V ⊆ Zk of lattice points with V ⊆ [−M,M ]k;
(I3) an integer p with 1≤ p≤ k
output, in binary encoding,
(O1) all points in the projection of V onto the last p components,
W = {w ∈Zp : ∃t∈Zk−p such that (t,w) ∈ V },
in lexicographic order.
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In addition, binary search can be used to optimize a linear function over a lattice point set
encoded as a rational generating function.
Theorem 4 (Linear Optimization Theorem). Let the dimension k and the maximum num-
ber ℓ of binomials in the denominator be fixed. Then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for
the following problem. Given as input, in binary encoding,
(I1) and (I2) as in Theorem 3
(I3) a vector f ∈Z
k,
output, in binary encoding,
(O1) an optimal solution v
∗ ∈Zk of the optimization problem max{ 〈f ,v〉 : v ∈ V }.
We will use all the above results in the following constructions.
4. Calculating Pure Nash Equilibria in Integer Programming Games
Consider an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs as defined in Section 2. Our goal is to
encode the Nash equilibria of such a game as a short rational generating function. The most general
setting we provide an efficient algorithm for such an encoding is when the number of players and
the dimension of their action sets are fixed and each player’s DPLC payoff function has the form:
ui(s) =max
k∈Ki
fik(s)−max
l∈Li
gil(s) (5)
where we now assume that the size of Ki is a fixed. Since S is bounded we assume without loss
of generality that ui(s) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I and s ∈ S. The analysis proceeds with two fundamental
insights. First, when there are a fixed number of “convex” pieces, i.e., when |Ki| is fixed, each
player’s payoff is piecewise linear concave within the region where an fik’s remains maximum. The
second insight is that when payoffs are piecewise linear concave the hypograph of the payoff function
is then a polyhedral set, encodable as a short rational generating function.
First, a simple result towards partitioning the action profile space into regions according to the
values of the linear pieces of the payoffs. We assume that Ki is a totally ordered set.
Lemma 1. For each player i, the set of all action profiles can be expressed as a disjoint union
S =
⊎
k∈Ki
Sik
where
Sik =
{
s∈ S :
fik(s)≥ fij(s), j > k
fik(s)> fij(s), j < k
}
.
Proof. We first show that S =
⋃
k∈Ki
Sik and later establish it is a disjoint union. Clearly⋃
k∈Ki
Sik ⊆ S. It remains to show the reverse inclusion. Let s ∈ S and define J(s) = {j ∈ Ki :
fik(s) =maxk∈Ki fik(s)} and j(s) =minJ(s), then s∈ Sij(s).
To show that the union is in fact disjoint suppose by contradiction that there exists an s in
Sik ∩ Sik′ where k > k
′. If k > k′ then since s ∈ Sik this implies fik(s) ≥ fik′(s). However, since
s∈ Sik′ this yields that fik′(s)> fik(s), a contradiction. The result follows. 
Note that we could equivalently write Sik as follows,
Sik =
{
s∈ S :
fik(s)≥ fij(s), j > k
fik(s)≥ fij(s)+ 1, j < k
}
.
We can do this because the action profiles in S are integer vectors and the data defining the
functions fij are integral. The same holds true for all the strict inequalities in this paper, and thus
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the alternative descriptions using a strict inequality or a weak inequality with one unit added to
the larger side of the inequality are used interchangeably throughout.
The next step is to refine the partition of S to account for all players simultaneously. To do
so we introduce the following convenient notation. Let K=
∏n
i=1Ki be the set of all vectors k=
(k1, . . . , kn) of indices where ki ∈Ki for i ∈ I. Using this notation, denote by Sk the intersection
S1k1 ∩ · · · ∩ Snkn . Employing this notation we state the following simple corollary of the previous
lemma:
Corollary 1. The set of action profiles can be partitioned as follows:
S =
⊎
k∈K
Sk
Thus each action profile s lies in a unique subset Sk of S where it is known that the payoff for
each player i is
ui(s) = fiki(s)+min
l∈Li
gil(s)
and hence a piecewise linear concave function of s. To take advantage of this concave structure in
the payoff we propose an extension of the game.
Definition 3 (Extended Game). Given an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs let
sˆ= (s;y) = (s1, . . . , sn;y1, . . . , yn) denote an extended action profile which includes variables yi ∈ Z
which keep track of payoff values. The set Sˆ of extended action profiles is the set
Sˆ =
⊎
k∈K
Sˆk (6)
where
Sˆk = {sˆ= (s,y) : s∈ Sk and 0≤ yi ≤ fik(s)− gil(s) for all l ∈Li and i∈ I}.
By Corollary 1 it is easy to see that (6) is a disjoint union.
We define the extended utility function uˆi for each player i as
uˆi(sˆi) = yi
which is a linear function on Sˆ. We call the tuple Gˆ = (Sˆ, uˆ1, . . . , uˆn) the extended game of the
original game G= (S,u1, . . . , un).
At this point there are three important observations regarding the definition of extended games.
Note that since S is a bounded by a polytope and the constraints 0≤ yi ≤ fik(s)− gil(s) for all l ∈
Li and i∈ I bound the values of yi it follows that each Sˆk, and thus Sˆ is bounded. This fact will be
important when encoding Sˆ by a rational generating function and applying the Linear Optimization
Theorem, which we have occasion to do in what follows. Note also that uˆi(sˆi) is a linear function
over Sˆ and thus more amenable to encoding by generating functions than the piecewise linear
payoffs of the original game.
We also remark that the extended game Gˆ is not a simultaneous-move game since the players’
choices are not independent and some choices of sˆ may lead to infeasibility. Similar issues are
explored in Bhattacharjee et al. (2000); however, we do not treat the extended game Gˆ as a game
unto itself, but simply as a mathematical construct to study the equilibria of the original game G,
and we thus ignore these considerations.
A key step is to establish a correspondence between the pure Nash equilibria to those of the
original game. As will be seen, this correspondence relies on the fact that the descriptions of the
action profile sets involve disjoint unions.
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In analyzing games we often consider deviations from the vector k= (k1, . . . , kn) in which the i-th
component ki is replaced with k
′
i ∈Ki. For convenience, let k−i denote the vector of the remaining
(unchanged) indexes; therefore,
(k−i, k
′
i) = (k1, . . . , ki−1, k
′
i, ki+1, . . . , kn).
We follow a similar convention in terms of action profiles. Namely, given an action profile s =
(s1, . . . , sn), if player i deviates to action s
′
i then we let s−i denote the (unchanged) actions of the
remaining players, so
(s−i, s
′
i) = (s1, . . . , si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . , sn).
The equilibrium concept used in the extended game is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Extended pure Nash equilibrium). Let Gˆ = (Sˆ, uˆ1, . . . , un) be an extended
game. An extended pure Nash equilibrium sˆ= (s;y) is an extended action profile where if sˆ ∈ Sˆk
then there does not exist sˆ′i = (s
′
i, y
′
i) such that (sˆ−i, sˆi
′)∈ Sˆ(k−i,k′i) and uˆi(sˆ−i, sˆi
′)> uˆi(s).
Lemma 2. Consider the game G = (S,u1, . . . , un) and its extended game Gˆ = (Sˆ, uˆ1, . . . , uˆn) as
defined above.
(i) An extended pure Nash equilibrium of Gˆ must be of the form
sˆ= (s;u(s)) = (s1, . . . , sn;u1(s), . . . , un(s)). (7)
(ii) There is a bijection between the set N of pure Nash equilibria of the original game and the set
Nˆ of extended pure Nash equilibria of the extended game.
Proof. (i) Let sˆ= (s;y)∈ Sˆ. By the disjoint union (6) there exists a unique k such that sˆ∈ Sˆk.
It follows that s∈ Sk. For all i ∈N we have s ∈ Siki and yi ≤ fiki(s)−maxl∈Li gil(s) = ui(s). Thus,
uˆi(sˆ) = yi ≤ ui(s) = uˆi(s1, u1(s); . . . ; sn, un(s)). Hence, whenever yi <ui(s) it is profitable for player
i to deviate to the extended action (si;ui(s)). Therefore, an extended pure Nash equilibrium must
have the form (7). (ii) Consider the mapping ϕ :N −→ Nˆ defined by s 7−→ (s;u(s)). We claim ϕ is
a well-defined bijection. First we show that ϕ is well-defined, that is ϕ(s) ∈ Nˆ for all s∈N . Clearly
ϕ(s) is in Sˆ. Let s∈ Sk for some k. Now consider a feasible deviating action for player i, sˆ
′
i = (s
′
i, y
′
i),
where (sˆ−i, sˆ
′
i)∈ Sˆ(k−i,k′i) for some k
′
i ∈Ki. In other words, player i deviates from choosing si ∈ Siki
to choosing s′i ∈ Sik′i and changing yi to y
′
i. We have
uˆi(sˆ−i, sˆ
′
i) = y
′
i ≤ ui(s−i, s
′
i)≤ ui(s) = uˆi(sˆ)
where the second inequality holds since s is a Nash equilibrium for the game G and the final equality
follows from (i). It follows that sˆ is an extended Nash equilibrium for the game Gˆ and mapping ϕ
is well-defined.
It is clear that ϕ is injective. As for surjectivity, by part (i) if follows that every Nash equilibrium
in Nˆ has the form (s;u(s)) for some s∈ S. It just remains to show that all such equilibria arise with
s ∈N . Suppose the contrary, that is sˆ= (s;u(s)) ∈ Nˆ but s 6∈N . Then there must be a profitable
deviation s′i ∈ Si for some player i in the original game G; ui(s−i, s
′
i)>ui(s). This implies that there
is a profitable deviation sˆ′i = (s
′
i;ui(s−i, s
′
i)) in the extended game since
uˆi(sˆ) = ui(s)<ui(s−i, s
′
i) = uˆi(sˆ−i, sˆ
′
i).

With this bijection, we can now state the main result of the paper:
Theorem 5. Consider an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs given by the following
input in binary encoding:
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(I1) the number n of players, and a bound B ∈N;
(I2) for each i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, the dimension di and an inequality description (Mi,bi) of a
rational polytope Pi = {x∈R
di :Mix≤ bi} ⊆ [−B,B]
di;
(I3) for each i∈ I, nonnegative integers |Ki| and |Li|, and for all integers k, l such that 1≤ k≤
|Ki| and 1≤ j ≤ |Li|, integer vectors αik ∈Z
d, γil ∈Z
d (where d= d1+ · · ·+dn) and integers
βik, δik defining the affine functions fik : S→ Z and gil : S→ Z by fik(s) =αik · s+ βik and
gil(s) = γil · s+ δil for all s∈ S =
∏n
i=1(Pi ∩Z
di).
The set Nˆ of extended pure Nash equilibria of the extended game Gˆ = (Sˆ, uˆ1, . . . , uˆn) has a short
rational generating function encoding, which can be computed in polynomial time when the total
dimension d and the sizes |Ki| are fixed for all i∈ I.
Proof. We express the set of extended Nash equilibria as follows:
Nˆ = Sˆ \
n⋃
i=1
Di
where
Di =
⊎
k∈K
⋃
k′
i
∈Ki
projsˆ
{
(sˆ, sˆ′i) : sˆ∈ Sˆk, (sˆ−i, sˆ
′
i)∈ Sˆ(k−i,k′i), uˆi(sˆ−i, sˆ
′
i)≥ uˆi(sˆ)+ 1
}
(8)
Note that some of the projected sets may be empty.
The set Di is the set of action profiles where player i has a profitable deviation. The description
of Di in (8) is a union over profitable deviations from one set in the partition of Sˆ to another. This
description of Nˆ is easy to verify using the definition of extended pure Nash equilibria.
We now establish that Nˆ can be encoded as a short rational generating function. First we claim
Sˆ admits such an encoding. Consider the description of Sˆ given in (6). The sets Fik are sets of
lattice points inside rational polytopes and thus encodable as short rational generating functions.
This in turn implies that Sˆk admits such an encoding since it in turn is the set of lattice points
inside a polytope. By the Boolean Operations Theorem, it follows that Sˆ can be encoded as a short
rational generating functions in polynomial time, since there is a constant number of sets Sˆk under
the assumption that the sets I and Ki are of fixed size.
Note in addition that the sets to be projected in (8) are again sets of lattice points inside of
rational polytopes, by observing that the extended payoffs functions are linear. By the Projection
Theorem it follows that each set in the union can be encoded as a short rational generating function.
Using again the Boolean Operations Theorem we conclude that each Di, and thus Nˆ , admit short
rational generating function encodings which can be computed in polynomial time when the sizes
of the sets Ki are fixed for all i ∈ I. We remark that the outer union in (8) (indexed by k ∈K)
is a disjoint union; thus its rational generating function can be computed by adding the rational
generating functions of the parts, rather than using the construction of the Boolean Operations
Theorem. 
Corollary 2. Consider an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs given by the same
input as in Theorem 5. The set N of pure Nash equilibria has a short rational generating function
encoding which can be computed in polynomial time when the total dimension d and the sizes |Ki|
are fixed for all i∈ I.
Proof. By the previous theorem, we can encode the set of extended pure Nash equilibria, Nˆ , in
polynomial time. Using the bijective map ϕ given in the proof of Lemma 2 we can use an appropriate
monomial substitution in the rational generating function description of Nˆ to yield a short rational
generating function encoding for N . 
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The true power of the previous lemma lies in the fact that having a short rational encoding of a
set allows for efficient counting, optimizing and enumerating procedures as discussed in Section 3.
Using these techniques we can answer numerous questions of interest on the existence, uniqueness
and structure of equilibria.
Corollary 3. Consider an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs given by the same
input as in Theorem 5. There is a polynomial time algorithm to compute the number of pure Nash
equilibria, when the total dimension d and the sizes |Ki| are fixed for all i ∈ I. In addition, under
the same assumptions there is a polynomial time algorithm to find a sample pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, when at least one exists.
Proof. Given the short rational generating function encoding of N we calculate |N | in polynomial
time by counting methods discussed near the beginning of Section 3. If an equilibrium exists, we
can output one by running the polynomial-delay enumeration algorithm on N described in the
Enumeration Theorem and terminating just after one equilibrium has been generated. This can be
done in polynomial time. 
Note that the algorithm runs in time polynomial in the total number
∑
i∈I |Li| of “concave”
pieces in the payoff functions. This corollary can be used to answer the question of whether a
unique pure Nash equilibrium exists – simply check whether |N |= 1. The following result is also
immediate by the Enumeration Theorem.
Corollary 4. Consider an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs given by the same
input as in Theorem 5. There is a polynomial-space polynomial-delay algorithm to enumerate all
the pure Nash equilibria of the game when the total dimension d and the sizes |Ki| are fixed for all
i∈ I.
Reflecting on the content and context to the results of this section, we make the following useful
remarks.
Remark 1. Considering the number of elements of the game we need to fix in Corollary 3 –
fixed number of players, fixed dimension of the polytopes, fixed sizes of the Ki – one might ask
if there is an alternate method to generating functions that might yield similar results. The key
observation is that the action sets are described implicitly as lattice points in polytopes given
by linear inequalities, and thus the number of actions for each player may be exponential in the
input size. Thus, simple enumeration of all the action profiles in S is a computationally intractable
approach to the problem.
Remark 2. It was shown in Proposition 1 that every normal form game can be expressed as an
integer programming game with DPLC payoffs. Note, however, that the dimensions of the action
spaces are equal to number of corresponding actions in the normal form game. Indeed, using the
notation of the proof of Proposition 1, we have Si ∈ Z
Ai . From a complexity point of view this
representation is unsatisfactory. In Corollary 3 we require the dimension of the action spaces to be
fixed, and thus we can only handle a fixed number of actions in the underlying normal form game.
Normal form games with a fixed number of players and fixed number of actions are computationally
uninteresting.
Remark 3. The Cournot game in Example 1 fits the assumptions of Corollary 3. We assume
that the number n of players (manufacturers) is “small”, i.e., fixed, in order for each manufacturer
to have appreciable market power. We also assume that the total number d of products is small.
The sets Ki have cardinality O(2
di), which is fixed, and thus the decomposition of S in Corollary 1
is comprised of a constant number of subsets. Since the algorithm in Corollary 3 scales polynomially
with the sizes of the sets Li, we can afford a variable number of “concave” pieces in the description of
the payoff functions. These “concave” pieces are used to represent general concave revenue functions
and the convex parts of the cost functions, when restricted to integer points.
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5. Related computations
In addition to counting and enumerating pure Nash equilibria, generating function techniques can
be used to derive efficient algorithms for related computations for integer programming games.
Several of these are discussed in the following subsections.
First, note that the encoding of the set of Nash equilibria as a short rational generating function,
being a compact representation, is useful for learning about the specific structure of a game’s
equilibria. For instance, a simple calculation suffices for deciding the existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium where player i plays a given action s¯i. Indeed, simply find the short rational generating
function encoding of
N (s¯i) =N ∩{s ∈ S : si = s¯i}.
in polynomial time under the same assumptions in the previous section.
Now onto some more sophisticated calculations.
5.1. Pareto optimality
Consider the question of finding Pareto optimal pure Nash equilibria, if any exist, in an integer
programming game with DPLC payoffs. To tackle this, we start by encoding the set of Pareto
optimal action profiles of the game.
Theorem 6. Consider an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs given by the same input
as in Theorem 5. The set PO of Pareto optimal action profiles has a short rational generating
function encoding, which can be computed in polynomial time when the total dimension d and the
sizes |Ki| are fixed for all i∈ I.
Proof. The proof is similar to those in the proof of Lemma 2, Theorem 5 and Corollary 2:
(i) Define P̂O as the set of Pareto optimal points in the extended game and find a generating
function encoding for P̂O.
(ii) Derive a bijection between PO and P̂O.
(iii) Use the generating function of P̂O and the bijection to obtain the generating function of PO.
For part (i) consider the following decomposition of P̂O:
P̂O = {sˆ∈ Sˆ : ∄ sˆ′ ∈ Sˆ such that (uˆj(sˆ
′)≥ uˆj(sˆ) for all j ∈ I) and (uˆi(sˆ
′)> uˆi(sˆ) for some i∈ I)}
= Sˆ \
n⋃
i=1
PDi
where
PDi =
⋃
k,k′∈K
projsˆ
{
(sˆ, sˆ′) : sˆ∈ Sˆk, sˆ
′ ∈ Sˆk′ , uˆj(sˆ
′)≥ uˆj(sˆ) for all j 6= i, uˆi(sˆ
′)≥ uˆi(sˆ)+ 1
}
is the set of Pareto dominated points due to a better alternative for player i. By analogous arguments
an in the proof of Theorem 5 we can encode P̂O as a short rational generating function in polynomial
time.
As for (ii) the argument is nearly identical to that in the proof of Lemma 2 and is therefore
omitted. Finally, (iii) uses the same idea as found in the proof Corollary 2. 
Using the Boolean Operations Theorem we obtain a short rational generating function encoding
of the set N ∩PO of all Pareto optimal pure Nash equilibria of the original game:
Corollary 5. Consider an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs given by the same
input as in Theorem 5. The set of Pareto optimal pure Nash equilibria has a short rational generating
function encoding, which can be computed in polynomial time when the total dimension d and the
sizes |Ki| are fixed for all i∈ I.
As in Section 4 we can use this generating function encoding to count and enumerate Pareto
optimal equilibria.
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5.2. Pure prices of anarchy and stability
The pure price of anarchy of a game measures the negative effects of competition on social welfare.
The social welfare of an action profile is the corresponding total payoff of all players. The pure price
of anarchy is the ratio of the maximum social welfare where the agents act together to maximize
their total payoff to the worst social welfare that arises from a pure Nash equilibrium. The pure
price of stability is the ratio of maximum social welfare to the best social welfare that arises from
a pure Nash equilibrium. The pure price of anarchy has been studied in various network games,
see Dunkel and Schulz (2008) and the references therein for recent results on weighted congestion
games. Using rational generating function techniques we can calculate the pure price of anarchy
and stability efficiently.
Theorem 7. Consider an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs given by the same input
as in Theorem 5. There exist algorithms to compute the pure price of anarchy and the pure price
of stability that run in polynomial time when the total dimension d and the sizes |Ki| are fixed for
all i∈ I.
Proof. Let w∗ denote the maximum social welfare attainable under cooperation of the players;
that is,
w∗ =max
{
n∑
i=1
ui(s) : s∈ S
}
. (9)
Again we work with the extended game. The first step in calculating w∗ is to note that
w∗ =max
{
n∑
i=1
yi : (s;y)∈ Sˆ
}
(10)
The equivalence of (9) and (10) is verified by first noting that for all (s;y) ∈ Sˆ, yi ≤ ui(s) =∑
i
uˆi(s;u(s)). Therefore, if (s
∗,y∗) is an optimal solution to the right-hand side of (10) then we
must have y∗i = ui(s) for all i∈N . This implies s is an optimal solution the right-hand side of (9).
To find w∗ we optimize the linear function
∑
i
yi over Sˆ. Every (s,y) ∈ Sˆ satisfies s ∈ [−B,B]
d
and
yi ≤ ui(s)≤B
(
max
k∈Ki
(||αik||1+ |βik|)+max
l∈Li
(||γil||1+ |δil|)
)
.
That is, (s;y) ∈ [−M,M ]d+n for some polynomially sized integer M . Since in Section 4 we found
a short rational generating function encoding of Sˆ, we apply the Linear Optimization Theorem to
calculate w∗ in polynomial time.
Let w˜ denote the worst social welfare attained by a pure Nash equilibrium; that is,
w˜=min
{
n∑
i=1
ui(s) : s∈N
}
.
To calculate w˜ we note
w˜=min
{
n∑
i=1
yi : (s;y)∈ Nˆ
}
,
which follows from Lemma 2(i). Using the short generating function encoding of Nˆ ⊆ Sˆ found in
Section 4 we again apply the Linear Optimization Theorem to calculate w˜ in polynomial time.
Thus, we obtain the price of anarchy w∗/w˜ in polynomial time.
The method for calculating the pure price of stability is similar. 
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5.3. Pure Threat Point
The pure minmax value to player i in a game is defined as:
min
s−i∈S−i
max
si∈Si
ui(si, s−i). (11)
Although mixed strategies are usually considered in calculating the (mixed) minmax values, here
we restrict attention to pure strategies. The vector of mixed minmax values is known as the (mixed)
threat point, which has drawn recent attention in the study of repeated games and explorations of
computational implications of the Folk Theorem (see Borgs et al. (2007)). Analogously, we define
the pure threat point as the vector of pure minmax values.
It was recently shown that, in various restrictive settings, the problem of calculating the (mixed)
threat point is NP-hard. For instance, it can be shown that computing the (mixed) threat point of
a three player game with binary payoffs ({0,1}) is NP-hard to approximate (see Borgs et al. (2007)
Theorem 1 for a precise statement and proof.) Despite this negative result we show that pure threat
points can be computed efficiently in our setting.
Theorem 8. Consider an integer programming game with DPLC payoffs given by the same input
as in Theorem 5. There exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute the pure threat point when
the total dimension d and the sizes |Ki| are fixed for all i∈ I.
Proof. We begin by demonstrating how to calculate the minmax value for player i in polynomial
time for each player i. Observe that an optimal value to the following bilevel optimization problem
is the pure minmax value of player i:
min
si,s−i
{
ui(si, s−i) : s−i ∈ S−i, si ∈ argmax
s′
i
∈Si
ui(s
′
i, s−i)
}
. (12)
This bilevel optimization problem (see Colson et al. (2007)) has essentially two players: a lower
level player, or follower, who is player i, and an upper level player, or leader, who represents all the
other players cooperating to “punish” i. Let
Gi =
{
s∈ S : si ∈ argmax
si∈Si
{ui(si, s−i)}
}
denote the set of bilevel feasible solutions to (12). Note that (12) is equivalent to min{ui(s) : s∈Gi}.
As before we turn our attention to the extended game. We define the analogous set Gˆi:
Gˆi =
{
sˆ∈ Sˆ : sˆi ∈ argmax
sˆ′
i
{uˆi(sˆ−i, sˆi) : (sˆ−i, sˆ
′
i)∈ Sˆ}
}
.
Observe that if sˆ= (s,y)∈ Gˆi then yi = ui(s). The set Gˆi can be expressed as Gˆi = Sˆ \Di, where Di
is defined as in (8). This follows since the optimization problem facing player i is the same problem
as when determining extended Nash equilibria is a single player game. Thus by a direct application
of Theorem 5 we can encode Gˆi as a short rational generating function. Note that Gˆi ⊆ Sˆ ⊆
[−M,M ]d+n whereM is as defined in the proof of Theorem 7. By applying the Linear Optimization
Theorem find the optimal value of minyi : (s,y)∈ Gˆi =min{ui(s) : s ∈ Gi}, in polynomial time
under the stated assumptions. The pure threat point can thus be calculated in polynomial time by
finding the minmax value for each player. 
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6. Stackelberg–Nash equilibria
We now turn to applying these techniques to a sequential setting. In a Stackelberg–Nash game,
Player 0 (the leader) chooses an action, described by a vector s0 ∈ S0. The remaining players i ∈
I = {1, . . . , n} (the followers) then simultaneously choose their actions si ∈ Si(s0). Each player
i∈ I0 = {0,1, . . . , n} then collects a payoff ui(s0, s) where s= (s1, . . . , sn).
We assume S0 = P0 ∩Z
d0 where P0 is a rational polytope. For each s0 ∈ S0 the followers play an
integer programming game with DPLC payoffs. The action of each follower i∈ I is described by a
vector si ∈Z
di from the set Si(s0) = Pi(s0)∩Z
di . We assume Pi(s0) is the rational polytope
Pi(s0) = {x∈R
di :Mix≤ πi(s0)} for i∈ I
where πi(s0) is an integer valued affine function. Let d= d1+ · · ·+ dn and d
+ = d0+ d.
Regarding payoffs, we assume each follower has a DPLC payoff ui(s), independent of the leader’s
choice s0 and given by
ui(s) =max
k∈Ki
fik(s)−max
l∈Li
gil(s). (13)
The leader’s payoffs are defined as the DPLC function
u0(s0, s) =max
k∈K0
f0k(s0, s)−max
l∈L0
g0l(s0, s). (14)
We assume all Ki and Li are finite index sets and all fik and gil are integer valued affine functions.
Observe that given s0 ∈ S0 we have a setup identical to that of Section 4, where the set of action
profiles for the followers is S(s0) =
∏n
i=1 Si(s0)⊆Z
d.
We are interested in computing an optimal action for the leader while guaranteeing there exists
a pure Nash equilibrium between the followers; see Remark 5 below for justification of our interest
in pure Nash equilibria. Let N(s0) denote the set of pure Nash equilibria between the followers
when the leader has chosen action s0 ∈ S0. As in Section 4, a pure Nash equilibrium in N(s0) is an
action profile s ∈ S(s0) such that for every i ∈ I there does not exist a deviation s
′
i ∈ Si(s0) such
that ui(s−i, s
′
i)>ui(s).
The leader faces the following optimization problem:
max
s0,s
{u0(s0, s) : s0 ∈ S0 and s∈N(s0)}. (15)
Let N+ denote the set of all Stackelberg–Nash equilibria, i.e., optimal solutions (s0; s) to the opti-
mization problem (15).
Remark 4. Note that this formulation implicitly assumes that the leader, after choosing s0, can
choose a pure Nash equilibrium s∈N(s0) in order to maximize her payoff. This is a generalization
to the case of competing followers of the “optimistic assumption” common in the multilevel opti-
mization literature. The simplest illustration of the assumption is in the bilevel setting where the
leader has the ability to choose among alternate optima to the follower’s problem (see Colson et al.
(2007)). Here we assume more generally that the leader can choose among the alternate pure Nash
equilibria between the followers.
Remark 5. The focus solely on pure strategies may need some motivation. Some choice of
s0 ∈ S0 may give rise to no pure Nash equilibria in the followers’ game, leaving only mixed Nash
equilibria. We assume that the leader will avoid such an s0, even if it gave rise to higher expected
payoffs. Consider this as an extreme form of risk aversion, where any equilibrium in pure strategies
in preferred by the leader so as to avoid any uncertainty in payoffs. By similar reasoning, we
also assume the leader will not be interested in the mixed equilibria when pure equilibria exist.
Extending the optimistic assumption discussed in Remark 4 we assume the leader can compel the
followers to reach a pure equilibrium whenever it exists.
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Theorem 9. Consider a Stackelberg–Nash game with DPLC payoffs defined by the following
input, given in binary encoding:
(I1) the number n of followers, and a bound B ∈N;
(I2) the dimension d0 and an inequality description (M0,b0) of a rational polytope P0 = {x ∈
Rd0 :M0x≤b0} ⊆ [−B,B]
d0 defining the leader’s feasible set S0= P0 ∩Z
d0;
(I3) for each i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, the dimension di, number mi of constraints, integer mi × di
matrix Mi, integer d0×mi matrix Φi and integer vector ψi ∈ Z
mi defining the affine function
πi : S0 → Z
mi by πi(s0) = Φis0 + ψi, and defining the follower i’s parameterized polytope
Pi(s0) = {x ∈R
di :Mix≤ πi(s0)};
(I4) for each i∈ I, nonnegative integers |Ki| and |Li|, and for all integers k, l such that 1≤ k≤
|Ki| and 1≤ j ≤ |Li|, integer vectors αik ∈Z
d, γil ∈Z
d (where d= d1+ · · ·+dn) and integers
βik, δik defining the affine functions fik :Z
d →Z and gil :Z
d →Z by fik(s) =αik · s+βik and
gil(s) = γil · s+ δil for all s∈Z
d;
(I5) nonnegative integers |K0| and |L0|, and for all integers k, l such that 1 ≤ k ≤ |K0| and
1≤ j ≤ |L0|, integer vectors α0k ∈ Z
d+, γ0l ∈ Z
d+ (where d+ = d0 + d) and integers β0k, δ0k
defining the affine functions f0k :Z
d+ →Z and g0l : Z
d+ →Z by f0k(s0, s) =αik · (s0, s)+β0k
and g0l(s0, s) = γ0l · (s0, s)+ δ0l for all (s0, s)∈Z
d+.
Then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the leader’s optimum payoff and a short
rational generating function encoding of the set N+ of all Stackelberg–Nash equilibria when the total
dimension d+ and the sizes |K0|, |K1|, . . . , |Kn| are fixed.
Proof. We mimic the development leading up to Theorem 5 in Section 4 by defining an extended
game with extended strategy profiles (s0, s,y) where yi ≤ ui(s) for all i ∈ I. As before denote
sˆ= (s,y). Let
Sik = {(s0, s) : s0 ∈ S0, s∈ S(s0), fik(s)≥ fij(s) for j > k, fik(s)> fij(s) for j < k}
and thus construct the disjoint union
Sˆ =
⊎
k∈K
Sˆk
where
Sˆk = {(s0, s,y) : s0 ∈ S0, s∈ Sk and 0≤ yi ≤ fik(s)− gil(s) for all l ∈Li and i∈ I}.
denoting Sk = S1k1 ∩ · · · ∩Snkn . Note that Sˆk is a lattice point set in a polytope, and thus we can
encode Sˆ by a short rational generating function.
Let Nˆ denote the set of extended action profiles (s0; sˆ) such that s0 ∈ S0 is any feasible leader
action and sˆ is a pure Nash equilibrium in the followers extended game when the leader has chosen
s0. Now express Nˆ as
Nˆ = Sˆ \
n⋃
i=1
Di
where
Di =
⊎
k∈K
⋃
k′
i
∈Ki
projs0,sˆ
(s0, sˆ, sˆ′i) :
(s0, sˆ) ∈ Sˆk,
(s0, sˆ−i, sˆ
′
i ∈ Sˆ(k−i,k′i),
uˆi(sˆ−i, sˆ
′
i)≥ uˆi(sˆ)+ 1
 .
Since all sets to be projected are lattice point sets inside polytopes, we can apply reasoning as in
the proof of Theorem 5 and encode Nˆ by a short rational generating functions under the stated
assumptions. We establish a bijection between Nˆ and the set N = {(s0, s) : s0 ∈ S0, s ∈ N(s0)}
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of feasible solutions to (15). We claim the function ϕ :N −→ Nˆ defined by (s0, s) 7−→ (s0, s;u(s))
is a well-defined bijection. The details are similar to that in the proof of Lemma 2 and are thus
omitted. Via this bijection we derive a short rational generating function encoding ofN by monomial
substitution.
Now, let N (v) denote the set of feasible solutions to (15) that guarantee the leader a payoff of at
least v:
N (v) = N ∩ ({(s0, s) : u0(s0, s)≥ v})
= N ∩
( ⋃
k∈K0
{(s0, s) : f0k(s0, s)− g0l(s0, s)≥ v ∀l ∈L0}
)
.
Note this is an intersection and union of polytopal lattice point sets. Since the size of K0 is fixed we
can apply the Boolean Operations Theorem to encode N (v) by a short rational generating function.
Now, using binary search for v between −B+ and B+ where
B+=B
(
max
k∈K0
(||α0k||1+ |β0k|)+max
l∈L0
(||γ0l||1+ |δ0l|)
)
,
and the counting algorithm to test for non-emptiness of N (v), we can find an optimal payoff v+ to
the leader. The set N+ is therefore equal to N (v
+). 
As in the previous section, a short rational generating function encoding of the set N+ of
Stackelberg–Nash equilibria leads to results analogous to Corollary 3 and Corollary 4. Thus, we
can derive efficient procedures to decide on the existence of and to enumerate Stackelberg–Nash
equilibria.
7. Conclusions and directions for further research
In this paper we introduced classes of games and proposed algorithms for studying their pure
strategy Nash equilibria using rational generating functions. The simplicity by which they can be
used to compute important information on the structure of these games, demonstrates the power
of generating functions as an analytical and computational tool for game theory.
There is considerable scope to explore applications of integer programming games to other situ-
ations. In addition, the use of generating function techniques is a novel approach to game theory
and can be applied to various types of games; e.g., threat point computations for repeated integer
programming games; games with other payoff functions; and computations related to other solution
concepts.
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